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CSDP and NATO Post-Libya:  
Towards the Rubicon? 
Jolyon Howorth 
In  the  wake  of  Libya  and  the  American 
pivot to Asia, CSDP-NATO relations must 
be  recalibrated.  The  buzz  word  for  CSDP 
should be: integrated through the EU and 
empowered through NATO. 
The  EU’s  Common  Security  and  Defence 
Policy  (CSDP)  is  currently  approaching  its 
Rubicon.  For twenty years, the member states 
dallied with cooperation in security and defence 
policy.    But  when  the  Libyan  crisis  broke  in 
spring 2011, their willingness and their ability to 
handle a regional operation of medium intensity 
were  shown  to  be  severely  wanting.    It  is 
difficult to over-state the extent to which Libya 
was precisely the type of mission for which the 
EU,  ever  since  its  collective  defection  in  the 
Balkans in the early 1990s, had been preparing.  
Yet,  when  push  came  to  shove,  political 
divisions  and  military  inadequacy  rode 
roughshod over strategic necessity. In the most 
serious  crisis  on  the  EU’s  borders  since  the 
birth  of  CSDP,  the  Union  proved  quite 
incapable  of  action.  This  raises  an  existential 
question:  are  the  EU  member  states  serious 
about  being  in  the  security  and  defence 
business at all? How much are they prepared to 
pay for it? Will they decide to actually cross the 
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Rubicon or will they take fright at their own 
temerity and abandon the CSDP experiment?  
 
Free-riding is a deeply engrained European 
habit. For forty years, West Europeans became 
accustomed  to  dependence  on  the  United 
States,  via  NATO,  for  their  very  survival. 
Debates  over  burden-sharing  were  constant.  
Even during the Cold War, all too few long-
term  NATO  member  states  came  close  to 
spending the agreed NATO target of 3% of 
GDP on “defence”.  By 2010, only three of 
them,  the  UK,  France  and  Greece,  spent 
above the new post-Cold War benchmark of 
2%, while the remaining 21 European member 
states  of  NATO  spent  an  average  of  1.3%.  
With  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  there  was  a 
scramble  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  for 
NATO  membership.  By  2004,  ten  former 
members  of  the  Warsaw  Pact  had  been 
admitted  and  these  were  joined  in  2009  by 
Albania and Croatia. To secure membership, 
all  these  states  temporarily  boosted  their 
defence spending. But by 2010, none of them 
was spending 2% and half of them were closer 
to  1%.  In  1990,  the  US  covered  60%  of 
NATO’s  overall  expenditure.  By  2011,  the 
figure was 75%.  There is little wonder that, in 
his valedictory speech in June 2011, Defence 
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Secretary  Robert  Gates  warned  that  if  this 
pattern  continued,  the  new  generation  of  US 
politicians, who had not come of age during the 
Cold  War,  would  cease  to  feel  that  the  US 
investment in NATO was worthwhile.  
 
Some say that Europe, in 2012, faces no real 
threats.  Why  therefore  should  it  devote  large 
sums to “defence”?  Europe may be internally 
at  peace  with  itself.    But  can  it  count  on 
continuing to live in peace?  A mere glance at 
the map is sufficient to answer in the negative.  
From  the  Arctic  Circle  (the  latest  “new 
frontier”)  to  the  Baltic  Sea  and  down  to  the 
Black Sea, from the Bosphorus to the Straits of 
Gibraltar,  destabilisation  hovers  around  the 
EU’s  entire  periphery.    The  Middle  East, 
Europe’s “next abroad”, is in effervescence and 
the Caucasus the site of multiple frozen (and 
not  so  frozen)  conflicts.  The  sea-lanes  which 
facilitate E u r o p e ’s  trade  with  the  rest  of  the 
world,  from  the  Suez  Canal  to  Shanghai,  are 
rife  with  piracy  and  emerging-power  naval 
rivalries. To imagine that the EU can rely on its 
own internal Kantian pact to avoid engagement 
with  a  turbulent  external  world  is  not  simply 
naïve. It is irresponsible. 
 
CSDP HAS ISSUES  
CSDP faces three main sets of problems.  First, 
in addition to disagreements with the US over 
burden-sharing, there is the growing reality of 
American military disengagement from Europe.  
In relative terms, this has been inevitable since 
the fall of the Berlin Wall.  There is no doubt 
that the US and the EU remain each other’s 
most important partners in an emerging multi-
polar world. In terms of economics, trade and 
investment, the transatlantic relationship is the 
most  important  bilateral  relationship  in  the 
world. But from a strategic perspective, the US 
no longer sees Europe as the centre of gravity 
of  its  military  effort.  The  January  2012  US 
Strategic  Guidance  paper  makes  it  clear  that 
henceforth America’s focus will be on the Asia-
Pacific region and the Middle East. There is an 
unequivocal  assumption  (always  implicit  but 
occasionally explicit) that Washington expects 
Europe  increasingly  to  assume  responsibility 
for  crisis  management  in  its  own 
neighbourhood.   T h e  p r e s s u r e  o n  t h e  
Europeans  to  stand  up  and  be  counted  is 
mounting. The Libyan mission Operation Unified 
Protector introduced the concept of the United 
States  “leading  from  behind”.  This  was 
technically a misnomer.  Without massive US 
military inputs, the Libyan mission could not 
have been brought to a (relatively) successful 
conclusion.  But  the  Obama  administration’s 
insistence  that  Europeans  should  at  least  be 
perceived  to  be  “taking  the  lead”  in  Libya 
represented a paradigm shift in both political 
and  symbolic w a y s .    The  US  signalled  quite 
clearly  that,  henceforth,  it  wished  to t r a n s f er 
responsibility, in the European theatre, to the 
Europeans. We may still be a long way from 
the full operationalization of such a shift, but 
there is no doubt which way the balance must 
swing. Europeans have been served notice that 
Uncle  Sam  believes  it  is  time  they  came  of 
strategic  age.  In  order  for  this  to  happen, 
leadership  in  the  European  area  is  going  to 
have to change hands. As long as the US either 
insists upon or (de facto) assumes leadership in 
Europe, the Europeans will continue to free-
ride and will continue to fail to deliver.  
 
The second main problem has to do with 
military  (and  civilian)  capacity  for  the 
mounting of overseas missions under CSDP.  
So much has now been written about the need 
for “pooling and sharing” that it is difficult to 
say  anything  new  or  different.  Many  pooling 
and  sharing  projects  have  already  been 
initiated.  The  Belgian  and  Dutch  navies 
formed  a  single  integrated  command  in  the 
1990s.  In 2010, the European Air Transport 
Command  (EATC)  was  established  at 
Eindhoven  Airbase  in  the  Netherlands.  It 
offers a joint set of assets to the air transport 
fleets  of  France,  Germany,  the  Netherlands 
and  Belgium.    The  European  defence 
ministers,  meeting  in  Ghent  on  9  December 
2010, agreed to examine ways of categorising   3 
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defence  assets  under  three  heads:  those  that, 
for  reasons  of  strategic  imperative,  would 
remain  under  national  control  but  could  be 
made  more  interoperable  at  EU  level;  those 
that could offer potential for pooling; and those 
that could be re-examined on the basis of role- 
and  task-sharing.  In  November  2011,  the 
European  Defence  Agency  (EDA)  identified 
eleven  priority  areas  for  cooperative 
development,  including  helicopter  pilot 
training,  maritime  surveillance,  medical  field 
hospitals,  air-to-air  refuelling,  future  military 
satellite  communications,  ISR  (intelligence, 
surveillance  and  reconnaissance),  and  smart 
munitions. In March 2012, the EDA Steering 
Board  adopted  a  Franco-German-Dutch 
project for the joint procurement of air-to-air 
refuelling aircraft. Much is already happening. 
The  problem  is  that  it  is  essentially  a  small 
handful of the same EU member states which 
are  actively  engaged  in  European  initiatives, 
while  the  majority  take  refuge  in  discursive 
support.  For  pooling  and  sharing  to  be 
seriously  effective  in  terms  of  deployable 
European  capacity,  significant  transfers  of 
sovereignty will have to be agreed.  This may be 
painful for some member states, but it will be 
less  painful  than  the  total  loss  of  sovereignty 
implied in a given nation-state being unable to 
guarantee its own security.  
 
This introduces the third problem – which is 
also the most serious. It is the sheer poverty of 
political will and the widespread risk-aversion 
which afflicts so many EU member states.  It is 
the total absence within the EU of any strategic 
vision.  It is the lack, at EU level, of any sign of 
leadership.  Without  a  clear  sense  of  strategic 
objectives – or at a very minimum some clear 
notion of what it is the EU is attempting to 
achieve in the world – issues of capacity and 
responsibility  become  almost  meaningless. 
There is an urgent need for a trans-European 
debate about the real ambitions and objectives 
of CSDP.  In an age when inter-state conflict 
seems to be on the wane and when Afghanistan 
and Iraq have demonstrated the limited political 
usefulness of military force, what sort of role 
do the Europeans wish to play in the world – 
particularly in their own back-yard?  What role 
should military capacity play in their projects? 
How  do  they  understand  power  –  their  own 
and that of others? Assuming they can 
reach agreement on any of these issues, 
they then need to start planning.   For 
that,  they  need  a  strategic  planning 
agency. They need more meetings of the 
Council of Defence Ministers à la Ghent.   
They  need  the  synthesisation  of  those 
national strategic plans that already exist.  
They need a European Defence Review. They need 
a European strategic plan.   
 
For  twenty  years,  CSDP  has  muddled 
through in an ad-hoc way. That is no longer an 
option. Libya demonstrated unequivocally that, 
even after twenty years of preparation, the EU’s 
capacity to mount a significant military mission 
in its own backyard is grossly inadequate. It can 
be argued that it is difficult and requires time to 
coordinate  the  efforts  of  twenty-seven 
sovereign member states. Perhaps, but time is 
not likely to wait for those states to catch up. 
History is on the march. Risks and threats are 
on  the  rise,  not  simply  on  the  EU’s  direct 
periphery,  but  across  the  globe.  To  fail  to 
produce a policy and a strategy for coping with 
them  is  indeed  to  risk  irrelevance.  To  date, 
those  responsible  for  delivering  CSDP  have 
insisted on the importance of “autonomy” as a 
motivating  dynamic  and  an  organisational 
principle. In order not to be stifled at birth by 
their powerful transatlantic cousins, or micro-
managed  by  NATO,  the  Europeans-as-
international-actors, it was asserted, needed to 
find their own way in the world, to carve their 
own  path  towards  actorness.  In  the  initial 
“For  twenty  years,  CSDP  has 
muddled  through  in  an  ad-hoc 
way. That is no longer an option.”   4 
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stages  of  CSDP,  this  approach  made  perfect 
sense.  Alas,  the  quest  for  autonomy  has  not 
delivered either the necessary political will or the 
appropriate  material  capacity.  There  is  little 
reason for confidence that another twenty years 
of the same processes will produce substantially 
different results. As one that, for the past twenty 
years,  fully  supported  –  and  attempted  to 
theorise – the need for autonomy, I now believe 
this is the wrong approach going forward. It is 
time to re-think the relationship between CSDP 
and NATO, which, in practice, has led to sub-
optimal  performance  on  the  part  of  both,  to 
dysfunctional practices at both institutional and 
operational  levels,  to  many  crossed  political 
wires,  and  to  much  waste  of  resources  and 
effort. As long as this continues, neither NATO 
nor CSDP is likely to achieve its true objectives. 
 
NATO HAS ISSUES  
In  the  early  stages  of  the  2011  Libyan  crisis, 
there  were  some,  particularly  in  France,  who 
thought it possible that the EU might mount a 
CSDP military mission under a UN mandate to 
implement  the  concept  of  Responsibility  to 
Protect (R2P). Others imagined a Franco-British 
lead. In the event, the mission became – alost by 
default – a “NATO mission”.  I use the inverted 
commas because questions must be asked about 
the  very  nature  of  an  alliance  half  of  whose 
members  were  objectively  opposed  to  the 
mission.  Furthermore,  NATO’s  own  internal 
review of Operation Unified Protector reveals t hat  
the  mission  was  very  far  from  being  an 
unqualified  military  success.    This  raises  some 
important questions about NATO itself.  There 
are  three  key  issues  here:  the  nature  of  the 
alliance; the type and scale of cooperation; and 
leadership.   
 
The  constraints  of  the  Cold  War  and  bi-
polarity  dictated  tight  solidarity  between  all 
alliance  members  in  all  parts  of  the  globe. 
NATO  was  truly  an  alliance  as  traditionally 
understood.  Yet post-1989, in the absence of 
any existential nuclear or other type of threat, 
and in a multi-polar world, regional crises have 
an impact on NATO’s member state interests 
in very different ways. There is little likelihood 
of unanimity on anything, particularly at great 
distances  from  Europe.  The  “alliance”  has 
become a mechanism for generating coalitions 
of the willing. Donald Rumsfeld was (for once) 
correct:  “the  mission  determines  the 
coalition”.  NATO’s  most  recent  attempt  at 
self-definition, the 2010 New Strategic Concept, is 
in reality neither new, nor strategic. Nor is it 
even  a  concept.  It  is  a  document  which 
contains something fairly vague for everybody, 
but  nothing  very  precise  for  anybody.   
Although  NATO’s  Prague  summit  in  2002 
declared  that  distinctions  between  “in  area” 
and  “out  of  area”  were  no  longer  valid  and 
that the alliance could operate throughout the 
world,  and  although  this  precept  has  been 
implemented  in  Afghanistan,  there  is 
henceforth  very  little  prospect  of  European 
forces signing up to support US grand strategy 
around the globe.  The US drive for a “Global 
Alliance”  or  for  a  “League  of  Democracies” 
never found favour with Europeans and has 
probably been administered the coup de grâce by 
the experience of Afghanistan, which, however 
strong  the  official  spin  may  be,  is  almost 
certain to be judged by history as a military and 
political  failure.  Washington  is,  in  any  case, 
more  comfortable  with  multiple  bilateralisms 
than  with  ever  more  complicated  formal 
alliances,  as  the  recent  agreement  with 
Australia  and  the  constant  quest  for  new 
partnerships  indicate.  NATO’s  Chicago 
summit in May 2012 formally kept all options 
on the table, but on-going questions about the 
real nature and purpose of NATO are unlikely 
to  be  resolved  any  time  soon.  NATO  itself 
needs a radical re-think. 
 
CSDP AND NATO: STARTING AFRESH 
As for CSDP, assuming, in the wake of Libya, 
that it continues to move towards the Rubicon, 
its  cooperation  with  NATO  remains  more 
crucial  than e v e r .  It  is,  I  would  argue,  only 
through the NATO framework that CSDP can 
actually achieve operational effectiveness and,   5 
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eventually,  autonomy.  That  suggests  three 
things.   
 
•  First, it means that the Alliance should come 
back  to  Europe  –  including  its  entire 
periphery.  It  should  be  explicitly  re-
designated as a mechanism for guaranteeing 
regional stability in the European area and 
its  neighbourhood.  That  stability,  unlike 
during  the  Cold  War,  will  not  be  secured 
through  a  balance  of  nuclear  forces  or 
through existential deterrence, but through 
the  development  of  a  serious  capacity  for 
regional  crisis  management.  Collective 
security will complement collective defence.   
 
•  Second,  it  means  that  NATO  and  CSDP 
must stop seeing one another as rivals in a 
beauty  contest  or  as  contenders  for  a 
functional or spatial division of labour. The 
sterile  quarrels  over  duplication  in  general 
and HQs in particular must be transcended. 
In a world of shrinking resources, it must be 
recognised that European forces and capacity, 
whether deployed via NATO or CSDP are 
all drawn from the same pool. At the level 
of  procurement,  the  dynamics  of  pooling 
and sharing should be concentrated in the 
EU. It makes no sense to have two separate 
processes,  one  operating  within  NATO 
(smart defence) and another within the EU.  
There  is  very  little  chance  that  mere 
coordination  of  national  means  would 
suffice  to  meet  European  requirements. 
Shared  sovereignty  is  only  meaningful  if 
accompanied  by  policy  convergence  and 
shared security and strategic objectives – in 
other  words,  a  process  of  political 
integration.  Pooling  and  sharing  have 
political,  economic,  industrial  and 
operational implications. The EU is a global 
political  project,  whereas  NATO  deals 
“merely” with security. The EU is also the 
framework within which Europe generates 
common interests. Logically, therefore, it is 
the place where these interests can best be 
harmonised  at  the  level  of  the  defence 
industrial base. There is no question that 
this  European  procurement  process 
should be conducted in tight liaison with 
NATO,  but  the  EU  framework  is 
indispensable.  The  role  of  the  EDA 
should  be  central  and  Allied  Command 
Transformation  (ACT)  should  be 
transformed into an agency which ensures 
liaison with the US defence industrial base.  
 
•  Third,  there  must  gradually  and 
progressively  be  an  institutional  and 
political  merger  between  CSDP  and 
NATO.  This sounds outrageously radical, 
but in reality the structures of CSDP were 
modelled  on  those  of  NATO  and  the 
permanent  representatives  to  the  two 
military committees are, for the most part, 
the  same  individuals.  Enhanced 
cooperation  will,  over  time,  lead  to 
integration.  This paper is not the place to 
go  into  the  details.  The  key  issue  is  the 
direction in which the two entities should 
be  moving.  The  US  position  over  Libya 
indicates a way forward. 
 
Operational leadership must increasingly be 
assumed by the Europeans. This will require 
serious  restraint  on  the  part  of  Washington 
and  extreme  seriousness  of  purpose  on  the 
part of the Europeans.   CSDP must acquire 
operational autonomy through and within NATO 
and  the  Americans  must  learn t o  t a k e  a  
genuine  back-seat.  Progressively  the  balance 
within the Alliance must shift to one in which 
the Europeans are doing the vast majority of 
the heavy-lifting in their own back-yard, and 
the  Americans  are  acting  largely  as  force 
enablers.  There  should  be  a  return  to  the 
original structures of the 1949 Treaty. There is 
no  reason  why  SACEUR  could  not  be  a 
European flag officer.  The European caucus 
within  NATO,  far  from  being  taboo,  must 
become  the  corner-stone  of  the  Alliance. 
Europeans  must  stop  believing  that  NATO 
cannot work without US leadership.  However, 
this  proposal  also  depends  critically  on  US   6 
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willingness to accept regional leadership by the 
Europeans.  If  that  willingness  is  absent,  then 
the  entire  experiment  with  European  security 
and  defence,  whether  CSDP  or  an  enhanced 
NATO, will fail.  
 
CONCLUSION  
To  those  with  reasonable  memories,  this 
recalibration of the CSDP-NATO relationship 
may  look  strangely  familiar.  It  recalls  the 
experiment with the European Security and Defence 
Identity (ESDI) of the mid-1990s. This was the 
initial attempt to square the circles of European 
military  incapacity,  American  political 
disengagement, and actual regional turbulence 
which constituted the transatlantic response to 
the  Balkan  crises.  But  there  is  one  huge 
difference. ESDI was predicated on continuing 
US  primacy  and  American  leadership  of  an 
alliance in which Europeans would simply play 
a  more  functional  and  operational,  but 
subordinate,  role.  It  was  informed  by 
Washington-imposed conditionality (Albright’s 
“3 Ds”).  The US would retain a “right of first 
refusal”. The present proposal, by contrast, is 
for an arrangement whereby the Europeans will 
be encouraged to take over leadership in order 
to allow the Americans to disengage properly. 
It is, therefore, in this sense, the direct opposite 
of ESDI.  In the 1990s the ESDI buzz word 
was “separable but not separate”. The new 21st 
century  buzz  word  for  CSDP  should  be 
“integrated  through  the  EU  and  empowered 
through NATO”. 
I  recognise  there  are  huge  practical 
problems in going forward. These should not 
be  projected  as  obstacles  to  a  progressive 
merger which nevertheless makes sense. This 
is not an exercise in institutional tinkering. It is 
the most effective way in which Europe as a 
consequential  security  actor  can  actually 
emerge. The alternative, for Europeans, is to 
give  up  and  simply  submit  to  whatever  a 
rapidly  changing  world  delivers.  That  is  no 
alternative. 
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